CENTER REVIEW

Vol. 2 No. 2. *A Publication of the Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age* *Spring, 1988*

NEW THINKING IN THE NUCLEAR AGE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACEMAKING

The Corliss Lamont Lecture on International Security presented at Harvard's JFK School of Government, March 9, 1988 by Milton Schwebel, PhD, Rutgers University

Milton Schwebel's Lamont lecture reflected a long and thoughtful career in a field which has recently come to be known as "nuclear psychology." He began his lecture by presenting a review of the literature in one area of nuclear psychology, that concerned with children's and adolescents' concerns about nuclear war. He placed the information gleaned from this area of study into the context of one of the major theoretical advances in 20th century psychology: the idea that *meaning is not inherent in the external world, but is constructed through activity in a social context.* The "realities of the nuclear age," he said, are not definable simply in "objective" terms, but are defined and evolve developmentally, socially, historically, and culturally. In recent years, out of the evolving "nuclear reality" has arisen a general recognition that nuclear war threatens the survival of the species and that nuclear weapons ought not to be used as a tool of diplomacy. Such are the elements of "new thinking."

In presenting his overview of research findings, Schwebel claimed that children's concerns about nuclear war are real; to suggest that eleven year olds, for example, are unconcerned "is to demean (them) . . . to make them out to be idiots unable to comprehend meanings and consequences, or otherwise, to view them as automatons who are programmed to know but not to feel." Given this very real concern, on the part of children and adults alike, he asked, why do so few people do anything about it? His answer to this question reflected a departure from some of his colleagues in nuclear psychology, most notably, Robert Jay Lifton. Lifton attributes inaction to "psychic numbing." This, Schwebel said, is akin to blaming the victim. The more likely mechanism, Schwebel said, is "suppression:



Milton Schwebel, PhD

the deliberate putting out of one's mind that which cannot be helped at the moment, so that one can get on with life's business." The 80% of the American people who support the freeze, Schwebel reasoned, are not numb, they are frustrated, they feel powerless, and they are habituated to daily life in troubling times. If we need to assign blame for the inaction of the majority we should look to the system that frustrates the public's desires. Moreover, he argued, we should look to the peace movement, which has persisted to some degree or another throughout the nuclear age, for new means to reach and mobilize the public.

Toward that end, Schwebel offered four recommendations to peacemakers, particularly to those of the "nuclear psychology" stripe. First, he urged us to resist self-censorship. We should be bold, creative, and vocal. Second, we should avoid egocentric thinking and show sensitivity for the perspectives of our adversaries. Third, we should avoid faulty attributions of the sort: My behavior is shaped by my situation; yours is attributable to a personal disposi-

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DESPERATELY SEEKING THE SINGULAR

Nuclear Weapons Decision-Making and the Dominant Political Culture

By Kenneth Resnik

On the face of it, decisions surrounding nuclear weapons procurement are confusing. This is true for several reasons: first, secrecy surrounds almost any action which allegedly involves "the national defense." While the necessity of this secrecy is debatable, it is clear that such secrecy serves to undermine public knowledge of defense decisions and thus lessen military and political accountability. Further, the formal processes for making these decisions are remarkably complex and not open to casual understanding. Moreover, the language surrounding such decisions, replete with acronyms, jargon, and pseudo-technical terms, tends to confuse the casual observer.

This being the case, one would expect that a researcher could gain a more complete understanding of these decisions through determined study of the mechanisms for such decisions. When these mechanisms are understood, we should be able to analyze the process which shaped a decision, and thus explain the decision itself.

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INSIDE

BREAKING THE PEACE ACTIVIST-DEFENSE ANALYST IMPASSE... WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM DOWN UNDER

A Report from the Project on Assumptions and Perceptions that Fuel the Arms Race

by Richard Chasin, M.D. and Margaret Herzig

An adolescent with a habit of lying and stealing sits between his worried parents. He is "problem-saturated" — in deep trouble with a grim future. Australian family therapist, Michael White, poses numerous questions to the boy to help him stand back from his problems and consider the impact of those problems on his life. He asks not about how and why the boy misbehaves, but about how the boy's problems oppress him in daily life and limit his future. During the session, White is on the look-out for exceptions to the boy's troubled behavior — occasions when the boy might have misbehaved but didn't. By the end of the session, the boy has begun to take responsibility for his conduct. He and his parents see exceptions to the problem-saturated description with which they began, not the least of which is the boy's honesty with the therapist.

A young housewife feels inadequate and depressed. She cannot perform her drudgery with a smile. Michael White helps her to see her strengths — exceptions to her self-description — and to understand that she has been "subjugated to cultural specifications for personhood," specifications that include oppressive expectations and roles for women. She no longer feels inadequate, but joins the battle against this subjugation and begins to experience victory.

What do these cases have to do with dialogue between peace activists and defense analysts in Cambridge, Massachusetts? Dr. Richard Chasin, director of the Center's Project on Assumptions and Perceptions that Fuel the Arms Race, invited Michael White to interview five adults concerned with avoiding nuclear war: two representatives of the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, both defense analysts trained in physics, and three representatives of our Center, often dubbed "nuclear psychologists." The two Centers had a history of frustrating and unproductive dialogue. The defense analysts had shown little interest in the psychological perspective offered by the Center. The "real problems" of the nuclear age, they had argued, were political and strategic, not psychological. They felt that when psychological factors were relevant at all, they often played a minor, and usually unpredictable role. The psychologists had argued that the "techno-strategic approach" was dangerously narrow, and, in fact, incapable of framing crucial questions about human values and capabilities. These perceptions of inadequacy — not lying, stealing, fears, or depression — served as the initial focal point of Michael White's most unusual interventive interview.

> ***"You can move from being an insider to being an outsider but you can't lie on the railroad tracks, then expect to become Secretary of State."***

When White entered the consulting room, no one, not even White, knew what would happen. But White clearly had a plan. As in the cases described above, he would *externalize the problem*, help the participants *become aware of how it oppressed them*, search out *exceptions* to the "problem-saturated" description, use these exceptions to launch and nurture a *new description*, then help the participants begin to develop *new ideas about themselves and their future.*

White showed little concern for the content of the debate between the two groups. Their unproductive and ritualized debate was the problem that needed to be externalized. They needed to explore the impact of this frustrating dialogue on their lives. White did not presume that they had any solid motivation to solve this problem. He began the interview with the question, "What are the advantages of your having (effective) conversations with each other?" Representatives from both groups explained that they were interested in "broadening their horizons." Yet they often could not be receptive to each other, on each other's terms. The defense analysts' model, one psychologist said, "leaves out a million things about human knowledge and interactions." One defense analyst said that he has a very difficult time, intellectually, with the sort of distortions of fact that he has heard from some activists. The styles of thinking of each group (or at least stereotypes of it) were distasteful to the other.

Such blaming exchanges, however, did not typify the conversation that the five participants had about their previous conversations. Almost immediately, an "exception" occurred, an exception to the "problem-saturated description" of two groups each believing their own model to be adequate and the other's model to be inadequate. The defense analysts critiqued their own approach as narrow and "likely to miss something." They portrayed it as inappropriately emulating the hard sciences, as if human interactions could be described with the theoretical simplicity of physics. They did *not* say what the psychologists may have wanted to hear about the contributions that psychologists could make to correct this tendency. In fact, they questioned the "practical applicability" of psychology to issues of national security. Perhaps because of this, one of the psychologists failed to hear the self-criticism, and said that the defense analysts needed someone from the "outside" to point out the limitations of their approach. She, in effect, re-entered the problematic behavior by presuming that the defense analysts were seeking the "correct" view of the psychologists. Another psychologist heard the defense analysts' self-criticism as an "exception" and *became* self-critical himself.

One psychologist raised the question of power. "You may feel at times insecure and limited," she said, "but in fact you have the power. The Pentagon turns to you for consultants, not to our Center." This idea of being "in power" was a surprise to the defense analysts, who felt powerlessness, on the one hand, in contrast to the

"official" power of those in the current Republican administration, and, on the other hand, in contrast to the "popular" power of "new thinkers" like those at CPSNA. The group later speculated that we may all see ourselves as "passengers on the train." Is anyone secure in believing himself to be the conductor? A point of commonality, albeit incomplete, was found among the participants — a sense of powerlessness in the face of the multitude of forces that constitute the nuclear threat.

Another seed of commonality was planted in the first half of the interview when White discouraged references to the respective official heads of the two groups, both absent from the interview. He asked participants to focus on their *own ideas and experiences*. This seemed to help them appreciate the force with which their ideas and activities typically are defined by their institutional roles. The idea that one's views are shaped by one's institutional affiliation is, of course, not new, and we all know how easily institutional and professional rigidity melts in purely social settings, when the topic of conversation is newborn babies, aging parents, and experiences of adolescence. In such settings, professional role requirements are absent. In this setting, however, such role requirements weren't absent, they were loosened. The topic of conversation was still the problem of conducting effective dialogue about the nuclear dilemma. The participants were still speaking to each other as peace activists and defense analysts. But they were feeling less and less constrained to represent any one institution or leader. This growing departure from institutional roles allowed the participants, in Michael White's terms, to recognize their "subjugation to specifications," in this case professionally defined roles and ways of thinking. They appreciated the potential power and range of a *conversation among individuals*, as contrasted with *a debate between two groups*, in the presence of leaders, seated at opposite ends of the table.

Midway through the interview White asked his reflecting team, a group of therapists from the Cambridge Family Institute, to come into the consulting room, and he invited the interviewees to adopt the role of observers behind the one-way mirror. This role reversal served the purpose of a "structural intervention," as a new set of groups became salient for the interviewees; instead of representing two groups, they became one group in relation to a new group, the reflecting team.

When the participants returned to the consulting room, they continued to discuss the degree to which they felt shaped by their institutional contexts. When one of the defense analysts described this pressure as something that "happened" to him, one of the psychologists said, "But you're not *given* the role and the organization, you *choose* it." This led to a discussion of life choices and goals. One defense analyst said, "You can move from being an insider to being an outsider but you can't lie on the railroad tracks, then expect to become Secretary of State." He said that he did make a deliberate choice, to be on the "inside" at this time in his life, and that he appreciates the fact that activists can play an important role on the "outside." He resisted the assumption (which he assumed many peace activists hold) that people on the inside, including those who design nuclear weapons, are "war-mongers." If they were, he said, it would be easier to hate them. But they made a career choice, many of them after protesting the Vietnam War in college, "just like you and me." Admittedly, he said, their career choice has influenced their ideology over the years. He then echoed an earlier observation he had made from his personal experience regarding a group of scientists at a weapons lab. He described it as "depressing" to witness the degree to which the ideology of their profession had constrained their thinking.

One of the psychologists expressed the opinion that the defense analysts were sensitive to the influence of contexts, but said she felt a lack of openness on their part. White took this opportunity to note the most striking exception to the problem-saturated description of past attempts at dialogue. He said, "In this interview it has been my experience that x (the defense analyst referred to above) took the first step in expressing insecurity, and that he located it for us in a depressing experience. It is a bit paradoxical, isn't it, that x has shared his own personal experience with us a bit more complexly than the rest of us." This observation flew in the face of the stereotypic attitudes with which past dialogues had been attempted.

It is interesting to note that such challenges to stereotypes often invite a new kind of question into a stale dialogue: questions of curiosity. It was only in the second half of White's interview that curiosity questions were asked, e.g. a psychologist asked a defense analyst, "What was it like for you to sit in that meeting at the Kennedy School?" Curiosity questions typically yield further challenges to previously unexamined stereotypes and assumptions; once this process is set into motion, ritualistic debates can be disassembled and new forms of dialogue fashioned.

One of the psychologists noted that it had been helpful to converse about conversing. She said that in having to reflect on the conversation you begin to think about it as *your* conversation. This is, of course, what Michael White had in mind when he designed his opening question — to externalize the problem, then have participants reflect upon what it does to them and what they can do to it. In this case, the problem was the dialogue. Externalizing the dialogue allowed the participants to view it as their own construction and to take responsibility for it. They became more acutely aware, in White's terms, of "constructing their own construction." In viewing this construction, with White's guidance, the participants came to appreciate exceptions to their "problem-saturated description" of their interactions, and they became aware of the institutional forces that they have allowed to impose specifications on their behavior and to discourage exploration of new and enriching perspectives. ■

Margaret Herzig and Richard Chasin, MD

CORPORATE LEADERSHIP WITH A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE:

Conversations for Wholeness

by John E. Mack, M.D.

It is commonly acknowledged that individuals tend to behave differently in a private or family setting than they do as members of institutions. This split, or *fragmentation of self,* may be so great that people seem, at times, to live double lives. If, in our inescapable identification with the institutions in which we work, and the inevitable pressures we experience within them, we live in violation of privately held values and ideals, the result may be vague but profound discontent whose source may not be readily identifiable. It is only through overcoming these divisions in the self — through an aligning of our private and collective selves — that genuine satisfaction and well-being may be possible. Much of the interest displayed by contemporary Americans in psychotherapeutic techniques and spiritual paths which stress healing, integration, and wholeness grows out of the distress caused by the fragmentation of the self.

The private corporation is a social institution with unique properties. It is specially suited for the production of goods and the provision of services on a variety of scales, for the creation of employment, and for giving a return to its shareholders. At the same time, the very characteristics which make it so attractive and well suited for these purposes — perpetuity, leadership anonymity, special rights of ownership and limited liability — also seem to encourage the psychological split between private and institutional responsibility. Anonymity, potential institutional permanence, relative immunity from social accountability, and limits on fiscal liability have their psychological counterparts, potentially shielding individual executives and shareholders from personal responsibility for the social consequences of corporate policies and decisions.

Executives often seem to be protected from psychological distress related to this *fragmentation of self* by their corporate role which encourages them to take a competitive approach to commanding a larger market share, especially in the context of increasing global pressures. Executives may have little time for socially responsible activity unless this is seen as having immediate financial importance for the company. At the same time, more and more members of corporations are becoming aware of the human cost of perpetuating the split between private and institutional values.

The discovery and application of psychological techniques which could reveal and heal this self-fragmentation might have profound implications for the well-being of individuals in their corporate work. These techniques could also facilitate the evolution of corporations themselves in the direction of greater productivity and social value.

It is important to the maintenance of self-worth, both for employers and employees, that members of a company feel they are producing something of value and that they themselves are valued participants in an enterprise which benefits other people. Without these ingredients, workers and managers may experience personal discontents which range from vague job dissatisfaction to personality disturbances accompanied by specific psychiatric symptoms. Social responsibility may ultimately prove to be more consistent with personal self-interest and with productivity (at least in the fullest human sense) than we have previously realized, although not always with the maximization of profit.

Productivity is tied to work satisfaction and a sense of personal wholeness, to a healing of the separation of the private and the corporate self. But work satisfaction itself, in this interdependent world, may require a sense that one is contributing to the well-being of the larger human community, a feeling that "outside" activities conducted through the organization are aligned with inner psychological and spiritual needs and values, so that the private and the collective self are one.

We all can cite examples of corporate leaders who have looked beyond narrow nationalism(s) to a global vision, have moved past the rationalizations of ideology toward the possibility of East-West partnership, or have seen the necessity of deferring immediate financial gain for the deeper rewards of longer term social and community commitment. Yet the pressures on corporate leaders to remain competitive and to produce a maximum return for the companies' owners are so intense that it may be unrealistic to expect that corporate renewal and community responsibility can develop purely from within the company.

The Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age hopes to play a useful role in exploring the divisions between the personal and the corporate self and, ultimately, to foster a reconciliation of internal and external, private and public beliefs and values. Toward that end, we are initiating "conversations for wholeness" with corporate leaders who have and have not experienced or acted upon this fragmentation of self. In addition, we plan to bring together, in informal meetings, corporate leaders, academicians from schools of business, and other resource persons skilled in the psychology of organizational development and transformation. The purpose of these meetings will be to explore with business leaders questions of personal integration and the obstacles they confront in trying to reconcile organizational pressures with their commitment to social and community responsibility. ■

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Many thanks to our dedicated volunteers

LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE FROM AUSTRALIA

by Paula F. Gutlove, DMD

Australia may be "down under" but, as I discovered during my recent trip half way around the globe, it far surpasses us in some exciting areas. My trip was originally conceived as a pleasure excursion and a visit to relatives but, with only slight effort, I found a great deal of curiosity in Australia about the work of our Center and became very curious, myself, to learn more about such Australian organizations as the Commission for the Future and the Peace Research Centre.

Before I left the United States, I was contacted by the central office of the Victorian Council for Children's Film and Video, Ltd. (in Melbourne). The Council is a non-profit entity which seeks to stimulate and maintain public interest in the provision of suitable film, television and video entertainment for children. They were interested in learning more about our videotape, "A Day at School in Moscow," and any other educational videos we might have, and asked if they could distribute our video materials in Australia and New Zealand, where there is a burgeoning interest in the Soviet Union. The Council has close ties to the Australian Commission for the Future, representatives of which were in attendance at a presentation I made to the Council about the Center. The Commission for the Future was so intrigued by our work, that before I knew it, speaking engagements, including a national radio interview, were set up to further publicize our work.

The Australian Commission for the Future, a federally funded research and public education organization, was founded to grapple with the role of science and technology in the lives of Australians. Australians generally recognize that developments in science and technology increasingly shape the economy, educational institutions, and the work and leisure lives of the public. Yet, most Australians have had few opportunities to discuss the role that technological developments could and should play in shaping their future. Like many Americans, Australians are overwhelmed by the sheer bulk and complexity of technological data and the speed of technological change.

The Commission was established in response to this situation. Its major role is to democratize scientific and technological decision making and to discover ways to involve people who are often excluded from the decision making process. The Commission does not develop policy or lobby for political action. Rather, it seeks to identify crucial questions and encourage informed debate in the areas of: Work, Education, Health, Environment, and "Information, the Economy and Society." The Commission publishes a series of occasional papers, a listing of which is available from the Center. They were fascinated by the work the Center has done on children's perceptions of the future and images of the enemy, and are currently exploring with us the possibility for joint work.

A very different chord was struck at the Peace Research Centre (PRC) of the Australian University of Canberra, the capital of Australia. The Peace Research Centre was established by the government in 1984, through the Department of Foreign Affairs. Its purposes are: 1) to carry out research on topics relating to the establishment and maintenance of peace on national, regional and global scales; and 2) to provide training to future researchers in this field. The PRC has a working paper series, written by authors internationally, on current research dealing with peace and security issues, particularly as they relate to the Pacific region. Information about the working papers is available from the Center. While the working papers include a number of titles which relate to the research of our Center, (e.g.: Women and Peace through the Polls; Belief Systems and Arms Control Probabilities; Australian Public Opinion on National Security Issues) researchers at the PRC felt that the field of political psychology was in its infancy in Australia, and expressed great interest in the work of the Center. They were familiar with and intrigued by the writings of Carol Cohn (Language and Thinking of Nuclear Defense Strategists: "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals") and similarly with many of the works of John E. Mack. They expressed interest in discussing possibilities for more in-depth psycho-social inquiries within their organization.

What began as a journey to friends and family, to sunny weather and rolling beaches, became an opportunity to glimpse mechanisms for change in a similar, though clearly different, culture in the Southern Hemisphere. As technology brings us closer together, it becomes easier to form collaborative endeavors, even with those on the opposite end of the Earth. As is evidenced by this and other Center Australian-American interactions (see p. 2) the possibilities for joint work, and the opportunities to learn from each other are enormous, and we at the Center feel fortunate to be able to take advantage of them.

CENTER WELCOMES NEW ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

Penelope Hart Bragonier, PhD

Penelope Bragonier has recently joined the staff of the Center as Associate Director. Dr. Bragonier earned her doctorate in Developmental Psychology from Columbia University where she studied the relationship between family structure and boys' differentiation processes. Her interest in the development of polarized representations of the self-other relationship is relevant to the Center's exploration of the psychology of conflict.

As a Research Associate at Bank Street College of Education in New York, Dr. Bragonier investigated the impact of work on family life in a blue collar population. She has also served for the past two years as the Director of a drug abuse prevention council in suburban New York.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENEMY IMAGES: UNIVERSAL AND CULTURE-SPECIFIC THEMES

A Report from the Project on Images of the Enemy

by Petra Hesse, PhD and Debra Poklemba, BA

While summit meetings between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan are powerful and moving political gestures, they are far removed from the sources of enmity in political collectives. The Project on Images of the Enemy seeks to understand better the origins of interpersonal and political conflict so that we can *prevent* the sort of international hostilities that summit meetings are designed to de-escalate.

We are currently writing a book presenting drawings of personal and political enemies by children and adolescents from different cultures, and analyzing research findings by psychologists and political scientists on the origins of enmity in childhood and adolescence. This project is part of a larger endeavor aimed at understanding the psychological roots of interpersonal and international conflict through the study of children's and adolescents' conceptions of enemies at different points in their emotional, moral, and political socialization.

In an attempt to explore some of these developmental trends, we are interviewing hundreds of children, and collecting thousands of drawings, stories and statements about personal and political enemies. At this point, our sample consists primarily of 4 to 6 year old American children, but we have also begun to talk to older American children. Based on pilot data from children and adolescents from West Germany, Colombia, Samoa, Israel and Argentina, we are exploring potentially universal developmental trends as well as more culture-specific themes affecting children's images of enemies.

The results so far indicate that 4 to 6 year old American and West German children, when asked to draw an enemy or enemies, draw one person who looks "different." The enemy's body tends to be distorted. Either he has additional limbs or teeth, or some part of his body is missing. As Stephanie, 5, put it, "The one with no eyes, no nose and no hands." Furthermore, all children describe the enemy as strong, and many say that the enemy carries a gun. They tend to expect the enemy to be angry. While most children concede that women or girls can be enemies, they tend to describe the enemy as a man. Interestingly, most girls in the 4 to 6 year old group do not know what an enemy is, and when asked to draw a "bad guy," they prefer to draw rainbows or "good girls" instead.

When asked to characterize what enemies do, all children in the youngest age group agree that enemies threaten or even destroy people by robbing, fighting, shooting or eating them. Most children in this age group believe that the enemy has always been bad. One girl even said that enemies are born bad. Similarly, when asked whether enemies can become friends and vice versa, most children deny the possibility of such an event. Children in this age group also reject the notion that they are ever somebody else's enemy.



A nine year old American boy grasps enmity as a relationship.

Some of the potentially universal developmental trends we have identified so far suggest that children in the youngest age group (4 to 6 year olds) think of enemies as one scary, strange person. Slightly older children (7 to 9 year olds) begin to accept that enmity is a relationship between them and somebody else in which each partner is the other's enemy. However, children in this age group do not yet seem to have a politicized notion of enmity.

By the time they have reached adolescence, young people show signs of an emerging awareness of the more political dimensions of enmity. For example, they begin to draw flags indicating their understanding of the international nature of conflict and enmity. Pollution, nuclear war, and racism, i.e., more global and abstract images, replace monsters and bullies as enemies in adolescents' minds.



The world as a time bomb, drawn by a fourteen year old West German girl.

In late adolescence, another phase seems to emerge. Instead of portraying AIDS, nuclear war and other threatening forces in the world environment as the enemy, older adolescents begin to reflect on the origins of enmity. They express in a variety of ways that enemy images are creations of the human mind. While children up to early adolescence project evil impulses onto monsters and destructive forces in their environment, older adolescents and young adults clearly struggle with a more internalized sense of good and evil that allows them to own their evil impulses.

A four year old Colombian boy draws soldiers in the street.

Enemy Images

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In addition to these trends in the development of enemy images, the following culture-specific themes have emerged so far. American Jewish children and children growing up in conflict-ridden countries seem to develop an image of the political enemy comparatively early. For example, Tanja, a 5 year old American Jewish girl, told us, "My mother told me about him, he is a bad guy, because he killed many Jewish people. He killed them just because they were Jewish . . . *Is there anything else you know about this bad guy?* No, just that he killed many Jewish people. *Do you know why he did that?* No . . . *Do you know the name of the bad guy?* No." In a similar fashion, 4 to 6 year old Colombian children, when asked to draw enemies, drew scenes of the guerilla warfare they witness in Colombia. Israeli children tend to draw Arabs and symbols of Nazi Germany.

Conversely, children in Samoa may never develop a politicized notion of enmity. Very young children as well as adolescents tend to draw centipedes or dogs as enemies, suggesting that the dangers within the immediate physical environment are more pertinent to all age groups than any threats that might be posed by political conflict.

What is the relevance of our findings? One message is a hopeful one. Young children have only a vague sense of other nations as enemies, unless they grow up in a country at war. As a result, parents, educators and politicians may have a good chance of succeeding at instilling in children a more flexible and complex notion of allies and enemies that will make it difficult to see the enemy as all evil and oneself or one's own country as all good. On the other hand, our findings have a more pessimistic implication. While young children do not yet clearly understand who their nation's enemies are, nor where they live, they already have a structure of enmity: the enemy is bad and cannot be good; they are good, and are never, or rarely, bad. Whether or not these early structures are outgrown, and whether or not children end up reproducing the enemy images of the older generation may depend on our willingness as parents, educators, journalists and politicians to rethink and refeel the content and structure of our images of ourselves and of our personal and political enemies. ■

JOHN E. MACK RECEIVES LOUIS B. DUBLIN AWARD

On April 15, 1988, Dr. John E. Mack received the Louis B. Dublin award from the American Association of Suicidology in recognition of his distinguished contributions to the field. Previous recipients of the award include Karl Menninger, Robert Litman, and Norman Kreitman. In his acceptance speech, Dr. Mack discussed gender differences in suicide rates and raised important questions about their political and societal implications. Following is a summary of Dr. Mack's comments.

Rates of completed suicide for men are consistently at least three times those for women. During the period 1970-1980, the male suicide rate increased 50% in the 15-25 year old age group and 30% among 25-35 year olds. Neither the overall increase in suicide rates nor the gender differences in those rates has been submitted to systematic analysis.

A recent paper presented by Rona Klein and Alexandra Kaplan at the Stone Center in Wellesley, Massachusetts, emphasized the importance for women of establishing human connection and reciprocal relationships. Women tend to resort to suicide only when no avenue exists to establish or re-establish human connection. The ratio of "gestures" to completed suicides in women is 20:1; in men it is 3:1. Thus, gestures might be thought of as an effort to form a relationship to let others know that one is in emotional crisis.

Men in our society are raised to be warriors and protectors, aggressive and capable of victory in competition. The socialization of boys focuses less on the communication of feelings and the development of interpersonal relationships than does the socialization of girls. Boys tend to develop into men well schooled in rational thought and strategy but ill-equipped to share their emotions or to grieve overtly. The National Institute for Mental Health recently released a task force report on suicide risk factors and recommendations to prevent suicide. One recommendation, buried among more actuarially related suggestions, was to increase "affective education," to teach children about the wide range of human feelings and emotions, their expression, and the need for human communication.

There are also political implications which relate to the link between suicide and homicide in a society, and the ways in which that society expresses aggression. In the United States there is a tendency to externalize aggression, to direct it towards an outside enemy. The enemy role is currently filled by the Soviet Union. The arms race by its very nature is suicidal, a military expression of global homicide and self-destruction. Is the arms race a reflection of collective male rage toward our society's institutions which foreclose the possibility of rich and emotionally satisfying relationships? Are men all too willing to bring down the world in their rage, hurt, and frustration over the incomplete fulfillment of their lives and their very being?

In the nuclear age, in this age of planetary interdependence, how do we want to raise boys? Is the model of the warrior a maladaptive one? Are we willing to sacrifice males in the service of our current social order? In order to avoid a mass collective suicide/homicide do we need more than the recommended increase in "affective" education? Should we also establish new patterns of childrearing, different role models, and new societal expectations for men?

John E. Mack, M.D., is Academic Director of the Center

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No Reason to Talk About It: Families Confront the Nuclear Taboo

by David S. Greenwald and Steven J. Zeitlin

Psychotherapists, like families, have tended to throw a shroud of silence around the possibility of nuclear war. Greenwald and Zeitlin have broken this silence in their pioneering research with families. In this new book, they present their research findings, as well as those of other psychologists, and offer specific recommendations for dealing with this painful topic. $23

Schwebel

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tional tendency that is resistant to change. Fourth, we should avoid overpsychologizing political conflict. "The hard reality is that the superpowers are the leaders of two competing systems. The world views underlying these systems are mutually exclusive in the sense that any given nation can hold only one or the other."

Referring to the members of his audience, Schwebel made a few comments about the relationship between defense analysts and nuclear psychologists, which he characterized as two kinds of "peacemakers." He located their general lack of relevance to each other in a fundamental difference of goal: The former seek to enhance deterrence, the latter to replace it. In spite of this difference, Schwebel said, it is possible for each to look with favor upon the work of the other.

Schwebel ended on a positive and hopeful note, suggesting that while international competition cannot be abolished, it can be managed to avoid violence. Those who judge such a vision to be unrealistic, he said, should recall the charges of utopianism leveled against the early civil rights workers. Their struggle wasn't easy, but it was effective. Ours can be too.

RESPONSES TO DR. SCHWEBEL

Two formal responses were delivered at the lecture, one by Dr. John E. Mack, Academic Director of CPSNA, the other by Dr. James Blight, Executive Director of the Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School. A third was submitted to *Center Review* by an audience member, Dr. Michael Perlman. Dr. Perlman is the author of *Imaginal Memory and the Place of Hiroshima*, to be published in June by the State University of New York Press.

Dr. Mack

Mack accepted Schwebel's characterization of nuclear psychologists as seeking to move beyond the "war institutions" in which deterrence is embedded; nuclear psychologists, he said, are at least *open to the possibility* that these institutions can be dismantled and replaced by something "more conducive to human survival." He then suggested two activities for psychologists to undertake toward this end. The first is to try to grasp the nature of enmity and distinguish the dimensions of an enemy relationship that are real from those that are ideologically created. The second involves revealing how societal fragmentation can erode social responsibility and confound the struggle against evil. Responsibility is not something to be assigned to a particular group in society; rather, it needs to be activated in each individual. And evil ought not be exclusively assigned to one's political rivals. "Evil is fairly well distributed throughout the human community."

To emphasize this point, Mack told the story of a Georgian Jew, Nodar Djindjihashvili, who longed for freedom from the ever-watchful eye of the KGB. When Djindjihashvili was finally set free, he took a job with the Voice of America. He soon discovered that the Soviet Union had no monopoly on rigid ideology. He ultimately lost his job for failing to toe the ideological line, and later wrote that his past and present homelands were "inseparable components of the same planet, where neither Hell nor Eden has been located."

Dr. Blight

Blight began by objecting to peace activists' failure to distinguish between the serious nuclear dangers we faced in 1961-62 and the rhetorical hostility of the early years of the Reagan administration. He claimed that Reagan is the peace movement's best friend as he has provided—particularly in 1981-82, before his "table manners were cleaned up"—the kind of cold war environment that makes a peace movement viable. Blight failed to see the rationale for peace activism in what he views as the relatively safe current era. There's no "pro-war" faction, he said, and "everyone has bought Einstein's idea." Moreover, he said that a peace movement may not be viable now that there are "no body bags coming back." He concluded, "I don't know quite where that leaves the peace movement (or) an intellectual subset of it, the nuclear psychologists." He warned against "worshipping activism for its own sake" and urged nuclear psychologists to recognize that their work, particularly when it involves reducing political conflict to psychological language, makes them not only irrelevant, but "quite odd" in the view of defense strategists. "As familiar and compelling as it is to you," he said, "it is exactly that weird to people for whom the psychological component is not trivial, but is certainly not primary." (See page 2 for a discussion of difficulties of dialogue between defense analysts and peace activists.)

Dr. Perlman

(Excerpts from a letter submitted to Center Review)

Nuclear reality itself, asserted Dr. Schwebel, is at bottom "unpsychological." Hence, we over-psychologize this reality when we employ exclusively psychological approaches to analyze our predicament.

While this is an important cautionary point, there is a huge distance between acknowledgement of many valid perspectives on the nuclear dilemma and the assertion that nuclear reality is *fundamentally* unpsychological. This assertion was paired with another, even more problematic one: psychologists, together with other peacemakers, "must accept" the political-economic reality of "two competing systems" and work to lessen the dangers inherent in this competition. I would argue that one can fully acknowledge the reality of U.S.-Soviet competition, while repudiating the bipolar ideology implicit in our image of "two competing systems." Unexamined acceptance of a bipolar ideology often becomes a form of the self-censorship against which Schwebel warns.

Further, to insist on the *fundamentally* unpsychological nature of nuclear reality is to make a political statement that ill serves our psychological (and ethical) inquiries into this reality. Psychologically-oriented peacemakers can then be seen as trespassers on the turf of policy-makers—unless, of course, they accept the basic premises of these latter. For psychological peacemaking is essentially *radical* in that it articulates utterly different visions of human realities.

Moreover, the "unpsychological" image of nuclear reality has its own psychology. To be "unpsychological" means to neglect the multiple meanings inherent in any act of imagination, and to take an image only literally. One such literalized image is that of "two competing systems." This tends to involve enemy images that embody one's own group's unacknowledged darker motives (faulty attributions) and acceptance of the nuclear status quo. Another such image is that of "defense," which simultaneously masks to one's self and national group (while yet displaying to the adversary) offensive and interventionist national postures; it serves as a *psychological* defense against nuclear anxiety.

Peacemaking, to be truly psychological, must move far beyond trying to work for a rational, manageable, "acceptable" level of U.S.-Soviet competition. The psychology of nuclear reality is the psychology of

Desperately Seeking *continued from page 1*

Yet this approach is clearly unsatisfactory when dealing with nuclear weapons decisions. While this study may tell us how a decision should have been made, it clearly does not account for why the decision that was reached came about. Indeed, the very study that reveals the mechanisms of decision-making, in my judgement, should also reveal that these mechanisms are a formality and only that. They play little part in the real decision-making process.

Still, this is the approach that most people use to understand decision-making, if they try to understand it at all. Most people, if confronted with the discrepancy between actual decision-making and formal processes, either posit evil on the part of those who make such decisions or say that the decision-makers must know something that we do not. There are two kinds of confusion at work here, one kind operates in those who study decision-making, and the other in those who try to explain it without study. Both these types of confusion, however, arise from and reflect the dominant political culture and the notions it has implanted in us. One element of that culture has to do with the nature of the debate surrounding nuclear weapons and the terms that it employs. Such terms as "national defense" and "national security" have taken on the twin American mantles of militarism and anti-communism; to be "soft on defense" one must be naive and underestimate the "Soviet threat." Clearly, the debate has been skewed in order to impart a sense of need for the huge military budget. The power of this cultural force is evident in the writings of many critics of nuclear decision-making who feel compelled to recognize the Soviet threat and the interest of government leaders in meeting that threat.

Further, the dominant political culture places a premium on the notion of "rationality." In the context of nuclear decision-making, to make a "rational" decision is to make a decision which serves the "national defense." It means to make an analysis of military "needs," and to build weapons systems which meet those needs. The aura of rationality that surrounds nuclear decision-making fails to consider the impact of the internal needs and desires of the military and governmental institutions within which the decisions are made, needs and desires that may have little to do with external threats to security.

Along with rationality, the dominant political culture places a high premium on "expertise." The public feels obligated to pay heed to the "nuclear priesthood" in this country because these men have been anointed experts. After all, it is difficult to argue with someone who has a command of the supposedly important technical language and strategic justification, especially if you have only morality and common sense to boost your own arguments. This patina of expertise is further bolstered by dominant conceptions of science. Science is seen as the ultimate expression of objectivity and rationality, and the mere title of scientist gives credence and legitimacy to one's pronouncements. This has provided a rationale for nuclear weapons decisions and discouraged public interest or participation.

Most critiques of decision-making reflect a problem in the dominant culture which I call "desperately seeking the singular." This is the search for a single model which will explain whatever problem is being looked at. In trying to explain nuclear decision-making, an economist will look for an economic model, a psychologist for a psychological model, and so on and so on.

Many of the notions that the dominant political culture advances, the premises on which nuclear decision-making are supposedly based, simply do not hold true. Nuclear decision-making fails even if one *does* accept the dominant political culture's definition of its objectives and methods. Enhancing national security, rationality, scientific analysis, and the legal political structure are all notions that are, in fact, foreign to nuclear decision-making.

The question then becomes, where does this leave us? How can we understand decision-making and explain it to others? This work remains to be done, but I have reached some conclusions about what an acceptable model would be.

First it is clear that any analysis of nuclear decision-making, in order to be complete, must be a multi-disciplinary one. If we are to understand the plethora of forces controlling nuclear decision-making, we must have a plethora of ways to understand them.

Related to this point, we must recognize that decision-making is not a static process, but a dynamic one. Different institutions have different interests at each stage of decision-making and also, obviously, have different interests according to what decision is being made. Thus, when we speak of the "constituency" that a weapons system gains at various times in its development, we must recognize that this constituency is not monolithic and static, but dynamic in itself.

This holds doubly true if we recognize that at isolated points in decision-making, individuals can have influence, but that the long period between the time a weapon starts development and the time it enters production (generally eight to twelve years) dictates that these individuals rarely remain in office throughout the development process for a weapons system.

At the same time, we must recognize that due to the structure of the United States government, there are nodes of power which remain influential for fairly long periods of time. This should not blind us, however, to the changes that can occur in those nodes of power. The relative influence of any node of power remains largely outside of its control, and the dynamic of decision-making rarely allows for permanent influence. There are many examples of this, from the fairly straightforward decline in influence of the Pentagon's Office of Systems Analysis to the more complicated changes in influence of Congressional committees that were a result of reforms instituted in the 1970's.

What remains clear is that we cannot allow the lenses which sometimes hamper and distort our vision of nuclear decision-making to blind us to a revolutionary analysis, and perhaps a revolutionary solution, to the problems we face. ■

Schwebel *continued*

nightmare, of the human proclivity for cruelty and mass violence that in earlier eras was imagined as the eternal torment of hell. The competing systems of the U.S. and Soviet Union, or any other international adversaries, are just brief expressions of the undying human capacity to inflict inhuman hells upon others.

Psychological peacemaking involves patient work toward the collective change to which Dr. Schwebel bore witness in his talk. It draws its vitality from the tension between our awareness that the human capacity for cruelty and killing will be with us always, and our refusal to accept what we are told about the need for institutions on which this capacity for cruelty thrives.

–Margaret Herzig

Ongoing Projects of the Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age

Decision Makers: A Biographical Study

Project Director: John E. Mack, MD
Project Consultant: Carol Cohn, PhD

Dr. Mack, a psychiatrist at Harvard Medical School, is the author of a Pulitzer Prize-winning psychological biography of T.E. Lawrence and has written numerous articles on the topics of national ideologies, decision making and the nuclear threat. This study draws on eighteen interviews that Dr. Mack has conducted among high level decision makers in the field of nuclear strategy and nuclear weapons procurement and deployment. These interviews have included a former United States President, a director and a former director of a national weapons laboratory, a former Secretary of Defense, a prominent aide of the House Armed Services Committee, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a pioneer in the development of the H-bomb and SDI, and the Senior Vice President of a nuclear weapons contracting corporation. Dr. Mack and his colleagues plan to interview several decision makers in greater depth and analyze the individual biographical and psychological forces which motivate these influential people. The publications that grow out of this work will also discuss the connections between these personal elements and the organizational and political influences affecting these individuals in the various institutions in which they work.

Nationalism, Ideology and the Self

Project Director: John E. Mack, MD

This project consists of a scholarly examination of the multi-faceted relationships among the self, ideologies (seen as cognitive/affective links between individuals and groups), and nationalism. This project will address the importance of historical origins as well as contemporary functions of nationalism as they pertain both to international political relations and to the psychology of individuals. In the course of this study, particular attention will be paid to issues of power, leadership, aggression, and the role of technology. It is intended that this study will offer an in-depth understanding of the psychological roots of nationalism, ideologies of enmity and nationalistic hatred, and susceptibility to demagogic recruitment. This work will be conducted with a view to discovering new solutions to political conflicts between national groups. It is expected that these new solutions will have policy implications for educators, persons working in the psychological sciences, and international leaders.

The Language and Thinking of Nuclear Defense Intellectuals

Project Director: Carol Cohn, PhD

Carol Cohn, drawing on contemporary theory of discourse and feminist theory, has studied the thinking and, in particular, the language of nuclear strategists and defense intellectuals at Harvard and MIT for the past three years. She is the author of the recent and extremely well received article, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals," which presents the first part of an analysis of her findings. Dr. Cohn's work in this area has been published in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* and in journals in West Germany, Finland, Sweden, and England. She has presented at numerous conferences, workshops, and colloquia. Dr. Cohn taught at The New School for Social Research in New York City for nine years and is currently a Senior Research Scholar at the Center.

Mapping the Decision Making Process

Project Advisors: John E. Mack, MD and Carol Cohn, PhD
Research Associate: Kenneth Resnik

Kenneth Resnik brings to his work with Drs. Mack and Cohn a background in American history and nuclear studies. This project has two objectives. The first is to develop a more complete understanding of the nuclear weapons decision making process as it occurs in the U.S. today. This entails both mapping the actual decision making process and developing a theoretical framework for conceptualizing what constitutes power and influence within that process. The second objective is to identify particularly powerful or influential decision makers in preparation for later studies. Mr. Resnik will draw upon a variety of materials which include, but are not limited to, government documents, official and unofficial critiques of government decision making processes, and historical case studies. This study is being carried out in collaboration with the Oxford Research Group (ORG) of England. The results will be published in the U.S. section of the ORG's *The Global Nuclear Elite*, and in other forms. See page 1 for a description of the initial directions that this project is taking.

Assumptions and Perceptions that Fuel the Nuclear Arms Race

Project Director: Richard Chasin, MD
Project Advisor: John E. Mack, MD
Project Coordinator: Margaret Herzig
Workshop Facilitator: Paula Gutlove, DMD

Dr. Chasin is a well known family systems therapist who has worked as a group facilitator in many settings of interdisciplinary and international exchange. Margaret Herzig brings to the project an academic background in philosophy as well as research experience in cross cultural psychology. Paula Gutlove, the Center's Executive Director, has extensive experience in organizing and directing conferences, workshops, and retreats. The purpose of this project is to explore and test the applicability of theories and techniques employed by family systems therapists to larger political systems. Specifically, Dr. Chasin and his colleagues have designed and conducted a number of events with the goal of promoting effective dialogue between groups with a history of stale and ritualized debate. They have worked not only with groups of Soviets and Americans, but also with defense analysts and peace activists whose attempts at dialogue have failed to reflect their common concerns regarding the avoidance of nuclear war. (See page 2 for a report on a recent project event). A key objective in the project's work is to unearth and to help transform destructive assumptions and perceptions in an atmosphere of openness and curiosity.

Helping Families Cope with the Nuclear Threat

Project Director: Steve Zeitlin, PhD

Dr. Zeitlin is a clinical psychologist with a practice specializing in family and marital therapy. He has studied the impact of bereavement on adolescent identity formation and has recently co-authored (with David Greenwald) *No Reason to Talk About It: Families Confront the Nuclear Taboo*, an analysis based on family interviews of the impact of the nuclear threat on development at various stages of the life cycle. The book concludes that communi-

Ongoing Projects

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cation between adults and children about the nuclear threat and global security can stimulate the development of the child, and foster social responsibility. This project focusses on the development of materials for adults to help them move beyond denial and blame to a more active position in which they can pass on to children positive models of caring for future generations. The project is divided into two parts:

1) Dr. Zeitlin will organize a conference for others engaged in studying and developing materials for families, schools, and community groups regarding families and the nuclear threat. The purpose of the conference will be to assess the materials already available and to determine where significant gaps remain.

2) A videotape will be produced which will illustrate the variety of ways that adults grapple with the nuclear threat. The tape will provide instruction about how to communicate with children of different ages about this topic and will be used in group contexts, such as PTA meetings or church groups, where discussions can be led to help adults clarify their own thinking.

Images of the Enemy

Project Director: Petra Hesse, PhD
Project Advisor: William Beardslee, MD

Petra Hesse, who has a PhD in Developmental Psychology and a master's degree in law and diplomacy, lectures on psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and on psychology at the University of Massachusetts and Tufts University. William Beardslee is the Clinical Director of the Department of Psychiatry at the Children's Hospital Medical Center and an Associate Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School. He has published extensively on the life histories of civil rights workers, on children's fears of nuclear war, and on the effects of growing up with a depressed parent.

Recent work in the field has pointed to the tendency for adults to, often irrationally, conceptualize various persons or groups of people as "the enemy." The enemy is then regarded as the embodiment of all that is evil, dangerous, and persecutory. It has been argued that this tendency to form images of the enemy, and the support for this tendency in the media, may be implicated both in the creation of a nuclear arms race and in the relative lack of public resistance to it. This project has as its goal an understanding of how stereotypical images of "the enemy" develop from early childhood through adulthood. The project has been designed in four parts, currently in various stages of completion:

1. *Stereotypes of national and ethnic groups.* Attitudes towards 16 national and ethnic groups are being examined through a questionnaire study conducted among 500 adults, college students, military personnel, and civilians. Respondents will be screened to insure that the sample includes representatives from a range of socioeconomic backgrounds.
2. *Developmental Perspectives.* In-depth personal interviews are being conducted with 400 American children and adolescents in an effort to track the childhood origins and development of stereotypical conceptions of both personal and political enemies.
3. *Cross-cultural perspectives.* In order to explore the impact of universal and cultural factors on development of images of "the enemy," a study of drawings is being conducted with 4,000 children and adolescents in the US, West Germany, Norway, Switzerland, Israel, Colombia, Samoa, and Argentina.
4. *Children's television.* Ten highly rated children's cartoon series (including Rambo, GI Joe, and Transformers) are being analyzed to ascertain how an enemy's image is constructed and what methods of conflict resolution are presented.

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Typesetting: ADS Printing Services
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